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INTRODUCTION
Beginning with the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act' in
1970, federal prosecutors used asset forfeiture as a criminal penalty for the
violation of a variety of federal statutes. The first of these statutes was the
Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations2 (RICO) statute, which upon
conviction permitted prosecutors to seize any assets maintained or acquired
by the defendant through a RICO violation.' Since then, Congress has
expanded the application of criminal forfeiture penalties to violations of the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise4 statute and the criminal money laundering
statute.5  While the use of civil forfeiture through in rem proceedings
1. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (1970) (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
2. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1963(a)(1) to (2).
4. Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-513,
§ 408, 84 Stat. 1236, 1265-66 (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 848 (2000)).
5. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1366(a), 100 Stat. 3707-39
(codified at 18 U.S.C. § 982).
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against assets has a long history in the United States,6 criminal forfeiture is
largely a new concept in this country.7
The controversy over the application of criminal forfeiture laws is not
rooted in its effect on criminal defendants, but rather the impact on third
parties to whom such defendants have transferred assets before their
conviction. Any assets obtained through criminal violations that are
transferred to third parties are subject to forfeiture upon the conviction of
the defendant transferor.8 Only those third parties who obtain criminal
assets as bona fide purchasers for value, and who were reasonably without
cause to believe the assets were subject to forfeiture, are immune from
losing their property.9
While the bona fide purchaser exemption would seem to protect
innocent purchasers of criminally obtained property, the expansion of what
courts define as criminal property subject to forfeiture has led to more
serious problems in the context of money laundering. The federal money
laundering statute provides that any funds involved in the laundering of
money are subject to forfeiture.1" The nature of money laundering is that
violators attempt to hide illegally acquired money by dividing it up and
depositing it in different accounts.' This creates a problem for prosecutors
attempting to separate the illegally obtained "dirty money" from the
legitimate or "clean money" with which it has been deposited. Prosecutors
have persuaded many courts to remedy this situation through the
application of the facilitation theory. 2 The facilitation theory argues that
when illegal money is deposited with "clean money," the "clean money" is
acting to hide the illegal money and the "clean money" becomes a part of
the crime.' 3 Therefore, if any amount of illegal money is deposited in an
account, the entire account, no matter how large, is subject to forfeiture. In
6. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 14 (1827) (explaining that civil forfeiture is an
in rem proceeding against the actual property to be seized by the government); United States v.
Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988) (explaining that civil forfeiture has been widely
used to seize assets used in the commission of a crime).
7. See Bruce J. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right
to Counsel of Choice: The Constitutional Dilemma and How To Avoid It, 43 U. MIAMI L. REV.
765, 768 (1989) (explaining that criminal forfeiture, as opposed to civil or in rem, has rarely been
authorized by Congress).
8. 21 U.S.C. § 853 (2000)
9. Id.
10. 18 U.S.C. § 982 (2000).
11. See Jon E. Gordon, Prosecutors Who Seize Too Much and the Theories They Love:
Money Laundering, Facilitation, and Forfeiture, 44 DUKE L.J. 744, 752 (1995) (describing
criminal attempts to launder money as well as the statutes making this activity illegal).
12. See, e.g., United States v. Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. 391, 397 (S.D. Fla. 1992)
(articulating the theory that when clean money is used in bank accounts to hide dirty money the
clean money becomes part of the crime and is also subject to forfeiture).
13. See id.
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many instances this will have the effect of subjecting all of the criminal
defendant's money to forfeiture.
The most alarming consequence of such forfeiture can be seen in the
Eleventh Circuit's 2003 decision in United States v. McCorkle.14  In
McCorkle, F. Lee Bailey, a criminal defense attorney, challenged the
forfeiture of a two million dollar retainer a client paid him for legal
services. 5 Bailey's client had been convicted of a violation of the federal
money laundering statute. 6 Because the assets used to pay Bailey had been
in an account that also included illegal money, the entire account was
tainted. The Eleventh Circuit ruled that Bailey's retainer was paid with the
proceeds of laundered money; thus, it was subject to forfeiture. 7
As McCorkle illustrates, most defendants will not have any assets
immune to forfeiture under the facilitation theory. Therefore, any criminal
defense attorney representing a client accused of money laundering faces
the risk of being denied payment if his client is convicted. This risk may
greatly reduce the willingness of defense attorneys to represent such
clients. In practice, the facilitation theory can have the effect of denying
defendants accused of money laundering of their Sixth Amendment right to
select and pay for the counsel of their choice. 8
While defendants will still be provided an appointed attorney, they
will be effectively denied their constitutional right to select who that
attorney may be. This Comment argues that the courts have improperly
read the ambiguous language of federal forfeiture statutes in a way that
denies criminal defendants their constitutional right to counsel of choice
and substantially inhibits the protections of the criminal justice system in
unintended ways.
Part I of this Comment discusses the historical evolution of forfeiture
laws and the expansion of criminal forfeiture penalties under the
facilitation theory of money laundering statutes. Part H analyzes the effect
of modern forfeiture laws on the ability of criminal defendants to hire
attorneys. Part III examines the policy implications of the current criminal
14. 321 F.3d 1292 (11 th Cir. 2003).
15. Id. at 1294.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. See Wheat v. United States, 486 U.S. 153, 159 (1988) (stating that the Sixth Amendment
provides for a defendant's right to choose his own counsel); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 73
(1932) (holding that a defendant must be given the right to select counsel); United States v.
Gallop, 838 F.2d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1988) (explaining that an essential element of the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel is that a defendant be given a reasonable opportunity to select his
own counsel); United States v. Burton, 584 F.2d 485, 489 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (stating an essential
element of the Sixth Amendment is that the defendant be able to obtain counsel of his own
choosing).
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forfeiture laws for private defense attorneys and the fairness of the criminal
justice system as a whole. Finally, Part IV suggests a solution by providing
an alternate interpretation of federal criminal forfeiture statutes from the
one currently espoused by the United States Supreme Court.
I. THE DEVELOPMENT OF FORFEITURE LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES
A. Historical Evolution of Forfeiture Claims
By the end of the eighteenth century, three different strands of
forfeiture laws had developed in England. 9 The first to develop was the
common law concept of deodands. ° Under this theory, any object that
directly or indirectly caused the death of one of the king's subjects was
forfeited to the crown.2' The object, or deodand, was used originally by the
crown for charitable purposes, but over time it was used as a means of
producing revenue.22 The second type of forfeiture, known as forfeiture of
the estate, was intended as a criminal penalty. Anytime someone was
convicted of a felony or treason, all of his or her real and personal property
was forfeited to the crown. 3 This practice was justified on the theory that a
felon or traitor relinquished the right to own property. 24 The final type of
forfeiture developed under English law was the only one to carry over to
the American system.25 It was a statutory forfeiture system based primarily
on violations of customs and revenue laws.26  The forfeiture action
proceeded in rem against the property to be forfeited and was not based on
the guilt or innocence of the owner of the property.27 Under this statutory
scheme, if the violation was based on the act of a third party unrelated to
19. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974) (providing
an overview of the history of common law forfeiture).
20. See J. William Snyder, Jr., Reining in Civil Forfeiture and Protecting Innocent Owners
from Civil Asset Forfeiture: United States v. 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1333, 1342
(1994). The deodands concept of forfeiture was part of the English common law until Parliament
created a cause of action for wrongful death through the passage of Lord Campbell's Act in 1846.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Gordon, supra note I1, at 746.
23. See id.
24. Id.
25. Id. at 747.
26. See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663, 682 (1974).
27. An example of an English statutory forfeiture statute is the Navigation Acts of 1660
which prescribed that all goods be shipped in English vessels. The statute provided for the
forfeiture of both the goods and the entire ship, without regard to whether the violation was
caused by the ship's owner or a member of the crew. Gordon, supra note 11, at 747. See
generally LAWRENCE A. HARPER, THE ENGLISH NAVIGATION LAWS: A SEVENTEENTH-
CENTURY EXPERIMENT IN SOCIAL ENGINEERING (1939) (providing a thorough explanation of the
English Navigation Laws).
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28the owner of the property, the property was still forfeited to the crown.
The American rejection of the concepts of deodands and forfeiture of
the estate was spurred largely by an open resistance to their role in the
English system. 29  The deodand system was neither recognized nor
prohibited by the U.S. Constitution or federal statute and has never
reappeared in American statutory or common law. In Calero-Toledo v.
Pearson Yacht Leasing Co.,3 the U.S. Supreme Court explained the
American rejection of the deodand concept by citing the Supreme Court of
Tennessee, which reasoned that the deodand system was founded on
superstition.3 The Tennessee Court explained: "[A]t the base of the
doctrine was superstition-the implication that the cart or the ox drawing
it, for example, was morally affected from having caused the death. 32
The colonial repudiation of English forfeiture of the estate was more
directly articulated than that of the deodand. Article III of the U.S.
Constitution included an express prohibition against the practice.33 Article
III states, "[T]he Congress shall have the power to declare the Punishment
of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or
Forfeiture."'  In 1790, the first Congress reaffirmed this stance by passing
a law prohibiting forfeiture of estate as a punishment for any criminal
violation. Congress has followed this original rejection of forfeiture of
the estate for nearly two hundred years, authorizing criminal forfeiture only
once from 1790 to 1970.36 The only recognition of criminal forfeiture in
the United States before 1970 was the Confiscation Act of 1862,"7 which
authorized the forfeiture of the life estates of Confederate soldiers.
Although American hostility towards the Crown's forfeiture policies
caused a quick rejection of the concept of deodands and forfeiture of the
estate, U.S. courts recognized and accepted the English model of in rem
forfeiture as early as the 1780s.38 Following the adoption of the U.S.
Constitution, Congress began authorizing a variety of statutory forfeiture
28. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 747-48.
29. See Winick, supra note 7, at 768 (explaining colonial hostility to the first method of
forfeiture under English law).
30. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
31. id. at 602 (citing Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916)).
32. See Parker-Harris Co. v. Tate, 188 S.W. 54, 55 (Tenn. 1916)
33. See U.S. CONST. art. I1, § 3, cf. 2.
34. Id.
35. See Act of April 30, 1790, ch. 9, § 24, 1 Stat. 112, 117 ("[N]o conviction or judgment
... shall work corruption of blood, or any forfeiture of estate.")
36. See United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1487 (10th Cir. 1988).
37. Act of July 17, 1862, ch. 190, 12 Stat. 589, 589. The constitutionality of this act was
upheld by Bigelow v. Forest, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 339 (1869).
38. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1342.
2004]
NORTH CAROLINA LA W REVIEW
laws closely resembling those of England. 39  All such statutes authorized
civil as opposed to criminal forfeiture, and like the English system,
forfeiture actions proceeded in rem against the property found to be in
violation.4" No action was taken against the owner of the property or the
person who brought the property into violation of law.4
The majority of the early American civil forfeiture statutes were for
violations of customs laws. Such statutes provided that where ships were
found to be carrying above a certain amount of contraband, both the ship
and the illegal goods were subject to forfeiture.42  Further statutes
authorized the civil forfeiture of ships found either exporting slaves from
the United States or involved in the slave trade in any way.43 Civil
forfeiture became firmly established and accepted as a means of regulating
and protecting shipping. Congress expanded this practice by using
forfeiture laws as a deterrent to piracy on the ocean.' These statutes
authorized the seizure and forfeiture of vessels engaged in piracy.45 On
their face, the anti-piracy statutes of the early nineteenth century appear
very similar to criminal forfeiture statutes in that they are punishing a
specific illegal act. However, these statutes do not require the conviction
or even a charge of piracy against the owner of the vessel.46 In fact the
guilt or innocence of the owner of the vessel has nothing to do with the
forfeiture. Unlike criminal forfeiture, the anti-piracy laws were in rem
proceedings operating specifically and only against the vessel used to
engage in piracy. 7
Congress further expanded the use of civil forfeiture beyond the
regulation of shipping at the end of the nineteenth century in an effort to
control alcohol production.48 The federal government had struggled to find
a way to collect revenues from many alcohol manufacturers. 49 In an effort
to combat this situation, Congress passed laws providing for the forfeiture
39. See id.
40. Id.
41. See id. at 1343.
42. See, e.g., Act of Aug. 4, 1790, ch. 35, § 40, 1 Stat. 145, 169-170 (repealed 1799) (stating
that goods that enter by ship and are not invoiced will be forfeited along with the ship); Act of
July 31, 1789, ch. 5, §§ 22, 26, 1 Stat. 29, 42-43 (repealed 1790) (same).
43. See Act of March 22, 1794, ch. 11, 1 Stat. 347, 349; Act of March 2, 1807, ch. 22, §§ I-
2, 2 Stat. 426, 426.
44. See Act of March 3, 1819, ch. 77, § 2, 3 Stat. 510, 512-13. Continued by Act of May
15, 1820, ch. 113, 3 Stat. 600, 600.
45. See The Palmyra, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1, 7 (1827) (stating that ships found to be engaged
in sea robbery, of a piratical character, or having a general habit of piracy are subject to forfeiture
under the statute).
46. Id.
47. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1342.
48. Id. at 1342-43.
49. Id.
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of illegal wines, stills, distilled spirits, and even the land on which the
illegal goods were discovered." Again, the only requirement was a
violation of revenue laws in connection with the property being forfeited."
Even alcohol already sold to third parties was subject to forfeiture, whether
or not the purchaser had any knowledge that it was produced in violation of
internal revenue laws.52
B. Early Organization Principles of American Forfeiture Law
American courts heard a significant number of disputes over civil
forfeiture during the course of the nineteenth century. Through the depth
of nineteenth century forfeiture case law, two underlying principles can be
identified.53 The first of these is the notion that civil forfeiture actions
proceed in rem against the property being forfeited.5 4  The most
distinguishing feature of civil forfeiture in the American system is that
there is no human defendant; it is as if the property itself committed the
crime.55 Through this common law fiction, courts have been able to
overcome arguments by property owners that their property could not be
seized and condemned without a corresponding criminal violation.56
In justifying this interpretation, the Palmyra57 Court recognized that as
a penalty for the commission of many felonies, English courts imposed
forfeiture of the assets involved in the felony to the crown.58 However, the
Court distinguished forfeitures attaching to felonies under English law from
those in response to violations of revenue laws.59 In forfeiture cases
dealing with revenue violations, English law required no underlying
conviction and held proceedings in rem against the property.60  The
Palmyra Court found the English revenue laws allowing forfeitures without
a criminal conviction more comparable to the forfeiture laws developed in
the United States.61  The Court further justified the rule simply by
articulating that American courts had always carried out civil forfeiture
50. Act of Feb. 18, 1875, ch. 36, § 16, 18 Stat. 307, 310.
51. See United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 14 (1889) (holding that all property found on
the premises of a distillery operation in violation of internal revenue laws is subject to forfeiture).
52. See id.
53. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 747-48, 755-64; Snyder, supra note 20, at 1333.
54. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 747-48.
55. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1345.
56. See id. at 1345.
57. 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 1 (1827).
58. See id. at 14 (explaining that in these cases forfeiture did not attach without the
conviction of an underlying criminal act).
59. See id. (stating that "this doctrine never was applied to seizures and forfeitures, created
by statute, in rem, cognizable on the revenue side of the Exchequer").
60. See id.
61. See id. at 15.
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proceedings in rem against the property.62 The Court summarized this
distinguishing principle of American forfeiture law by asserting that "[b]ut
the practice has been, and so this court understand[s] the law to be, that the
proceeding in rem stands independent of, and wholly unaffected by any
criminal proceeding in personam."63 This basic premise of civil forfeiture
has never been seriously challenged or disputed by later American courts.'
The second organizing principle of civil forfeiture law coming out of
nineteenth century jurisprudence can be referred to as the "relation back
doctrine."65 Under the relation back doctrine, title to property involved in a
violation of law vests in the government at the time the wrong was
committed.6 6 The early common law rule did not give the government the
authority to seize property subject to forfeiture until some judicial
determination that the property has been involved in an illegal transaction.67
However, once this judicial determination of forfeiture has been made, the
government is deemed to have held title to the property since the moment
the wrongful act occurred.6" Therefore, under the common law rule, if an
asset has been involved in an illegal act and is later transferred to an
innocent third party, that third party may still be forced to forfeit the
property if a court later finds the property in violation of law.69 This is
because under the relation back doctrine, the government took title to the
62. See id.
63. Id.
64. A thorough review of the applicable forfeiture case law and literature has revealed no
challenges to this principle.
65. See generally Gordon, supra note 11, at 755-64 (explaining prosecutors' use of the
relation back doctrine along with the facilitation theory to expand the number of assets subject to
seizure); Snyder, supra note 20, at 1343-44 (summarizing the relation back doctrine as one of the
three organizing principles of forfeiture law coming out of nineteenth century jurisprudence).
66. See United States v. 92 Buena Vista Ave., 507 U.S. 111, 126 (1993) (explaining that
under common law forfeiture, vesting of title in the government relates back to the moment when
the crime was committed); United States v. Stowell, 133 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1889) (stating that title to
illegal alcohol vests in the government at the time of the violation of revenue laws, even if it has
already been sold to a third party); United States v. Grundy & Thornburgh, 7 U.S. 337, 350-51
(1806) ("It has been proved, that in all forfeitures accruing at common law, nothing vests in the
government until some legal step shall be taken for the assertion of its right, after which .. . the
doctrine of relation back carries back the title to the commission of the offence.").
67. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1346.
68. Id. at 1344, 1347.
69. Several civil forfeiture statutes enacted in the 1970s and 1980s provide protection for
bona fide purchasers who had no reason to know the property was subject to forfeiture. See, e.g.,
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. 91-513, § 413,
amended by Pub. L. 98-473, § 303, 2301(d)-(f), 98 Stat. 2044, 2192, 2193 (codified at 21 U.S.C.
§ 853(c) (2000)) (protecting bona fide purchasers who at the time of purchase were reasonably
without cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture). However, the common law rule
provides no protection for innocent parties who purchase property that has been involved in an
illegal act and later becomes subject to forfeiture. See Stowell, 133 U.S. at 17 (reiterating that the
relation back doctrine cuts off all transfers subsequent to the illegal act, even to good faith
purchasers).
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property before it was ever transferred to the third party.
In United States v. Grundy,7° one of the first cases to recognize the
relation back doctrine, the United States Supreme Court held that it is fully
within congressional power to determine the time at which title to property
vests in the government.7 If the forfeiture is prescribed by statute, the
common law rules no longer apply, and "the thing forfeited may either vest
immediately, or on the performance of some particular act" as the
legislature shall provide.72 Where a civil forfeiture is proscribed by statute,
but Congress is silent as to the time of vesting, the common law rules
remain in effect.73
The courts continued to uphold civil forfeiture statutes through the end
of the nineteenth century and up through the first half of the twentieth
century.74 However, in the process of affirming these statutes, the courts
indicated a possible reluctance to extend the practice any further.75 In
United States v. One 1936 Ford Coach,76 Justice McReynolds expressed
concern for the potential imposition of civil forfeiture penalties on innocent
parties who are not significantly involved in illegal activities.77 He further
reasoned that, "[f]orfeitures are not favored; they should be enforced only
when within both letter and spirit of the law."78  Despite the courts'
indications of a desire to limit the application and expansion of civil
forfeiture law, when given the opportunity, they stopped well short of
declaring the technique unconstitutional.79
Civil forfeiture law continues to be used in the United States in its
traditional fashion as a means of enforcing customs and revenue laws.80
However, the use and impact of forfeiture laws drastically increased in
1970 when they were conscripted as a weapon in the fight against the
70. 7 U.S. 337 (1806).
71. See id. at 351.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1347.
75. See United States v. One 1936 Ford Coach, 307 U.S. 219, 226 (1939) (construing civil
forfeiture statutes narrowly in an effort to protect innocent third parties); Washingtonian Publ'g
Co. v. Pearson, 306 U.S. 30, 42 (1939) (stating that civil forfeiture penalties should not be
inferred from unclear language); Ins. Co. v. Norton, 96 U.S. 234, 242 (1877) (stating that "the
courts should be liberal in construing the transaction in favor of avoiding a forfeiture").
76. 307 U.S. 219 (1939).
77. See id. at 226.
78. See id.; see also Farmers' & Mechs.' Nat'l Bank v. Dearing, 91 U.S. 29, 33 (1875)
(stating that forfeitures are not favored in the law).
79. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1347-48 (arguing that civil forfeiture law is now too firmly
integrated in the American jurisprudence to reject it as unconstitutional).
80. See, e.g., 19 U.S.C. § 1703 (2000) (authorizing forfeiture of ocean vessels intended to be
used in violations of customs laws).
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growing narcotics trade.8' Congress, taking advantage of the continued
constitutionality of forfeiture laws, passed the Comprehensive Drug Abuse
Prevention and Control Act of 1970.82 The Drug Act provided for the
forfeiture of "all controlled substances manufactured, distributed, dispensed
or acquired, 83 "all raw materials, products, and equipment of any kind"
used in connection with controlled substances,84 all moneys or other things
of value furnished in exchange for controlled substances,85 and all real
property used in any way to facilitate a violation of the controlled
substances laws.86 This act was intended to provide prosecutors the tools
necessary to substantially reduce drug trafficking in the United States.8
One of the principle advantages the forfeiture provisions of the Drug
Act gave prosecutors was based in the civil nature of the penalty. Federal
prosecutors were previously forced to follow all the constitutional'
protections afforded defendants in criminal trials in order to get a
conviction. Under the civil forfeiture provisions of the Drug Act,88
prosecutors need not obtain a conviction in order to impose a forfeiture
penalty.89  In fact, a civil forfeiture can take place without prosecutors
charging anyone with a crime.9" The government need only show probable
cause that the asset it is seeking to seize has the required substantial
connection to the illegal activity.9' Once the government establishes
probable cause, the burden shifts to the property owner to establish by a
preponderance of evidence that the asset in question lacks the requisite
connection to the illegal activity.9
81. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1333-34.
82. Pub. L. No. 91-513, 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881
(2000)).
83. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(1) (2000).
84. See id. at § 881(a)(2).
85. See id. at § 881(a)(6).
86. See id. at § 881(a)(7).
87. See, e.g., Mark A. Jankowski, Note, Tempering the Relation-Back Doctrine: A More
Reasonable Approach to Civil Forfeiture in Drug Cases, 76 VA. L. REV. 165, 167 (1990)
(explaining the Drug Act's purpose of providing a significant deterrent to drug trafficking
through the imposition of major economic penalties).
88. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a).
89. See Nnadi v. Richter, 976 F.2d 682, 686 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that in civil forfeiture
actions the government need only show probable cause that assets were connected to the illegal
activity in order to seize them).
90. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 749-50.
91. See Nnadi, 976 F.2d at 686.
92. See United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 57 (2d Cir. 1993) (stating that after probable
cause has been shown, claimant has burden of proving the factual predicates to the establishment
of probable cause have not been met); United States v. 228 Acres of Land and Dwelling, 916 F.2d
808, 814 (2d Cir. 1990), (upholding the constitutionality of shifting the burden to the claimant to
disprove probable cause in civil forfeiture actions); United States v. One 1970 Pontiac GTO, 529
F.2d 65, 66 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that the civil forfeiture penalties of 21 U.S.C. § 881 "are not
criminal enough to prevent Congress from imposing the burden of proof on the claimant").
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Not only did Congress reinvigorate civil forfeiture law in the United
States under the Drug Act, but it took the more drastic step of authorizing
criminal forfeiture through the passage of the Organized Crime Control Act
of 1970.9' Unlike civil forfeiture, criminal forfeiture actions require an
underlying criminal conviction and defendants are provided all the usual
protections of the criminal justice system.94 Over the next fifteen years,
Congress passed a variety of criminal forfeiture statutes in an effort to
reduce the enormous profitability of organized crime and drug trafficking.95
Congress first attempted to directly attack organized crime through the
Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act in 1970 (RICO).96
Under RICO, a defendant convicted of violating a provision of the act is
subject to forfeiture of all interests in enterprises in violation of the act and
all assets acquired in violation of the act.97 Congress next authorized
criminal forfeiture as a penalty for violation of the Continuing Criminal
Enterprise law.98 A person convicted of a violation of the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise statute may be required to forfeit all profits gained
through the illegal activity.99
Finally, Congress enacted a criminal forfeiture penalty for violations
of federal criminal money laundering statutes."°  The federal money
laundering statutes make it a crime to disperse the proceeds of specified
criminal activities in an attempt to conceal the source of the funds.' °
Money laundering statutes are necessary because federal law requires
banks to report all transactions of more than $10,000 to the United States
Treasury Department. 2 In an effort to evade detection by Treasury
officials, violators scatter the proceeds of criminal activity in different
accounts to avoid making deposits in excess of $10,000.103 The federal
money laundering statutes make such acts of deception a crime and impose
severe penalties including fines, imprisonment, and criminal forfeiture."
93. Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 922 (codified in scattered sections of 18 U.S.C.).
94. See Snyder, supra note 20, at 1363.
95. See Winick, supra note 7, at 768-69 (explaining that Congress wanted to restrict the
economic bases that supported organized criminal operations).
96. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
97. 18 U.S.C. § 1963.
98. 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (2000). This statute is also known as the "Drug Kingpin Statute" and
was enacted as part of the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970. Pub.
L. No. 91-513, 511, 84 Stat. 1236, 1276 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. § 881).
99. 21 U.S.C. § 848.
100. 18 U.S.C. § 982.
101. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957. For an exhaustive list of what constitutes "specific
criminal activity" see 18 U.S.C. § 1956(c)(7).
102. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22(b)(1) (1994).
103. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 751-52 n.63 (explaining how criminals attempt to evade
the $10,000 reporting requirement).
104. See 18 U.S.C. § 1956(b) (listing the various penalties for violations of the federal money
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C. The Expansion of Forfeiture Penalties for Money Laundering Through
the Facilitation Theory
The single most significant step in the unintended and unnecessary
expansion of criminal forfeiture laws in the United States in the last fifteen
years was the development of the facilitation theory. The facilitation
theory is a judicially created concept based on a broad interpretation of the
civil and criminal forfeiture provisions of the federal money laundering
statutes. 5 The criminal forfeiture requirements of the money laundering
statute state that, "[tihe court, in imposing sentence on a person convicted
of an offense in violation of ... section 1956, 1957, or 1960 of this title,
shall order that the person forfeit to the United States any property, real or
personal, involved in such offense, or any property traceable to such
property."'' 0 6  The key prong in the facilitation theory is the court's
interpretation of the language, "any property ... involved in such
offense." ' 7  On its face this language simply means that any property
involved in a convicted money launderer's commission of the offense is
subject to forfeiture. However, many courts have held that when money
derived from legitimate sources is deposited in an account containing the
profits of illegal activity, the legitimate money is "involved in" concealing
the illegal money.10 8 The legitimate, clean money is said to have facilitated
the concealment of the illegal, dirty money and is therefore involved in the
act of laundering money. Thus, some courts, giving the broadest reach to
the facilitation theory, interpret this statute to authorize the forfeiture of
every dollar of clean money residing in any account that also contains dirty
money. 109
The first judicial recognition of the facilitation theory was a 1991
ruling of a federal district court in Hawaii."0 In United States. v. All
Monies ($477,048.62) In Account No. 90-3617-3,"' prosecutors sought to
seize the entire New York bank account of a Peruvian drug and money
laundering statutes). The criminal forfeiture provisions for violations of the money laundering
statutes are found in 18 U.S.C. § 982; the civil forfeiture provisions are found in 18 U.S.C. § 981.
105. While the actual federal money laundering statutes and their definitions are codified at
18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957, the criminal forfeiture provisions for violations of the money
laundering statutes are found in 18 U.S.C. § 982; the civil forfeiture provisions are found in 18
U.S.C. § 981.
106. 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1).
107. Id.
108. See generally Gordon, supra note 11, at 755-68 (providing a detailed examination of the
development and impact of the facilitation theory under 18 U.S.C § 981-982).
109. Id. at 760.
110. United States v. All Monies ($477,048.62) In Account No. 90-3617-3, 754 F. Supp.
1467 (D. Haw. 1991).
111. Id.
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laundering organization." 2 The claimant conceded that a limited amount of
money in the account was derived from illegal activity and was subject to
forfeiture under the money laundering statute."3 However, the claimant
argued and the government conceded that the majority of the funds in the
account were from legitimate business enterprises." 4 The government
argued that although the majority of the account was made up of legitimate
money, that legitimate money was being used to hide the illegal drug
money also contained in the account." 5 The government contended this
legitimate money was facilitating the laundering of the drug money and
should be forfeited as well." 6 The court agreed with the government's
theory and explained that, "Even though § 981 does not expressly include
the words 'facilitate' or 'facilitating,' the statute covers property 'involved
in' illegal money laundering transactions."' " The court held the entire
account forfeitable and set an example that continues to be followed
today."'8
Other courts quickly caught on to the facilitation theory established in
All Monies and expanded its use to impose a forfeiture of all the funds in
numerous accounts held by launderers." 9 In United States v. Certain
Funds on Deposit,"O owners of a credit union had deposited proceeds from
a criminal enterprise in three separate existing accounts.' 2' The court
112. See id. at 1469-71. The proceeding in this case was for a civil forfeiture and thus the
government only needed to show probable cause. See id. at 1471-76. But the application of the
facilitation theory after probable cause as established in civil forfeiture is exactly the same as after
a conviction is obtained in a criminal forfeiture. See id.
113. Id. at 1471-72 (stating that both parties conceded that $242,012.69 of the account was
the profits of illegal drug trafficking).
114. Id.
115. Id. at 1472.
116. See id. at 1472-73 (including the government's citation of a portion of the congressional
Record which stated that the phrase "property involved" included property used to facilitate the
laundering offense).
117. Id. at 1473.
118. See id. at 1482 (holding that the government showed probable cause that the entire
$477,048.62 was used to facilitate money laundering and was subject to forfeiture).
119. See United States v. Puche, 350 F.3d 1137, 1153 (1 1th Cir. 2003) (quoting United States
v. Bornfield, 145 F.3d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998)) (stating that "property" under the forfeiture
statute includes any property used to facilitate the laundering offense); United States v.
McGauley, 279 F.3d 62, 77 (1st Cir. 2002) (stating that the commingling of funds is enough to
sustain a forfeiture of the entire account after a money laundering conviction if it is shown the
funds were used to facilitate the laundering but vacating the lower court's forfeiture order on
other grounds); United States v. Bornfield, 145 F.3d 1123, 1135 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding that the
forfeiture of legitimate and illegitimate funds commingled in an account is authorized as long as
the government establishes the funds were pooled to facilitate the laundering); United States v.
Certain Funds on Deposit in Account No. 01-0-71417, 769 F. Supp. 80, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991)
(holding that all the funds in five different bank accounts were forfeitable under § 981 for being
used to facilitate the laundering of proceeds of a criminal act).
120. 769 F. Supp. 80 (E.D.N.Y. 1991).
121. Id. at 82.
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recognized that only a small portion of the money in each account was the
result of the criminal activity. 2 ' However, the court still found the entire
balance of all accounts to be subject to forfeiture because the legitimate
money facilitated the laundering of the criminal profits.'23
Although the courts have expanded the facilitation theory, they have
also proposed some limitations. In United States v. Certain Accounts,'24
money launderers deposited criminal profits in several otherwise legitimate
accounts in Florida and New York.'25 Prosecutors properly attempted to
seize the entirety of these accounts under the facilitation theory. 26
However, before the commencement of the forfeiture action, the violators
had drawn several checks from the accounts and deposited them in twenty-
seven different accounts. 27 Prosecutors attempted to seize the entirety of
the twenty-seven secondary accounts as well. 12 The court refused to allow
the government to seize the secondary accounts simply because checks
written from the primary accounts were deposited therein. 29 The court
explained, "[1]ike a contagious disease, each direct account could
contaminate any account that had dealings with it. The indirect accounts
could then conceivably pass on the infection to other accounts, and so forth
ad infinitum."'3° The court refused to adopt a per se rule that accounts
could be forfeited simply by receiving deposits from contaminated
accounts.' Rather, it said that the government must reestablish probable
cause that the legitimate money in each successive account is being used to
facilitate laundering of the criminal proceeds. 3 2
Certain Accounts demonstrates that the courts are not willing to let the
facilitation theory run rampant and expand forfeiture to include assets
never contemplated by Congress when enacting the forfeiture provisions of
the money laundering statute. To gain a greater understanding of the
proper scope of the facilitation theory,, it is necessary to examine the basis
for its existence. The argument behind facilitation rests predominantly on
two basic assumptions. First, one must assume that the word "facilitate" is
incorporated into the language of 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-982.' Most courts
122. Id. at 85.
123. Id. at 84-85.
124. 795 F. Supp. 391 (S.D. Fla. 1992).
125. Id. at 393.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. See id. at 397.
130. Id. at 398.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. See, e.g., United States v. Eleven Vehicles, 836 F. Supp. 1147, 1153 (E.D. Pa. 1993)
(stating that although § 981 does not contain the phrase "facilitating property" it is to be included
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that have attempted to justify a finding of incorporation do so by
referencing the legislative history of §§ 981-982.' As the statute was
originally written, only the profits or receipts of money laundering were
subject to forfeiture.'35 However, in 1988 the statute was amended to
provide for forfeiture of property "involved in" money laundering.
3 6
Courts have made reference to the Senate Judiciary Committee's
Comments on the amendment which include the forfeiture of assets used to
facilitate money laundering as one of the amendment's purposes.'37
However, a convincing argument can also be made that Congress did
not intend to provide for the forfeiture of assets used to "facilitate" money
laundering. The forfeiture provisions of the Drug Act'38 are very similar to
those in the federal money laundering statute under 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-
982.'3 However, in establishing which assets are subject to forfeiture for
violations of federal drug laws, Congress included the term "facilitate.""
The statute refers to, "[a]ll real property ... which is used, or intended to
be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission
of a violation of this subchapter ...." "I4 In contrast, in enacting the money
laundering forfeiture laws, Congress chose not to list assets used to
facilitate the laundering as subject to forfeiture. The applicable portion of
the statute states, "[a]ny property, real or personal, involved in a transaction
or attempted transaction in violation ... of this title ... ."I" It is difficult
to understand why Congress would include the facilitation theory in the
language of the drug statute and not the money laundering statute if it
within the construction because of the phrase "involved in"); United States v. Swank Corp., 797
F. Supp. 497, 500 (E.D. Va. 1992) (holding that assets which facilitate the violation of the money
laundering statute are subject to forfeiture under § 982); Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 397
(finding the facilitation of money laundering to be included under § 981); Certain Funds on
Deposit, 769 F. Supp. 80, 84 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) (finding the phrase "involved in" in § 981 to
include the act of facilitation).
134. See, e.g., Certain Accounts, 795 F. Supp. at 397 (stating that reading the forfeiture
statutes to include facilitation "is based on a sound understanding of the crime that Congress
sought to deter by enacting § 981"); United States. v. All Monies ($477,048.62) In Account No.
90-3617-3, 754 F. Supp. 1467, 1473 (D. Haw. 1991) (stating that "the legislative history makes it
clear that 'property involved in' includes property used to facilitate money laundering offenses").
135. See Money Laundering Control Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1366(a), 100 Stat.
3207-18, 3207-35 to 39 (1986) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-982 (2000)).
136. See Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 6463, 102 Stat. 4181, 4374
(codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 981-982). o
137. See sources cited in note 133. See also 134 CONG. REC. S17365 (Nov. 10, 1988)
(statement of Sen. Biden, Member, Senate Judiciary Comm.) (indicating that forfeiture would
"apply to the fee retained by the launderer and to any property he or she may have used to
facilitate the offense").
138. See 21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6) to (7) (2000).
139. See 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)(A); § 982(a)(1).
140. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) to (7).
141. Id. (emphasis added).
142. 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(l)(A).
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intended the facilitation theory to be applied in both.
If it is accepted that the first basic assumption of the facilitation theory
is met-that Congress intended to make assets used to facilitate money
laundering subject to forfeiture under §§ 981-982-then one must make a
second assumption for the current understanding of the theory to have
legitimacy. For the current interpretation of facilitation to go forward, it
must be assumed that the mixing of dirty and clean money in the same
bank account constitutes facilitation. There is little case law defining
facilitation in the context of money laundering due to the fact that
"facilitation" is not included in the language of the statute. Thus, most
courts have looked to the ample case law interpreting the facilitation
provisions of the drug forfeiture statute. 14 3 However, federal courts have
not been able to reach a consensus on what the government must prove to
show facilitation. 144
In interpreting the forfeiture provisions of the Drug Act, several courts
have adopted the substantial connection test. 145 This test requires that for
property to be forfeited, the government must establish a substantial
connection between the property and the underlying criminal activity.
1 46
Other courts have rejected the substantial connection test and maintain that
only a nexus between the property and the crime is required to support a
forfeiture.'47 After a thorough examination of the applicable case law, the
Second Circuit arrived at the conclusion that "the government must
demonstrate only a 'nexus' between the seized property and illegal drug
activity, not a 'substantial connection.' "48 Whether applying the
substantial connection or nexus test, the circuits agree that the connection
143. 21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6) to (7).
144. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 759 (explaining that some courts have required the
forfeitable asset to have a "substantial connection" to the underlying crime while others only
required a "nexus" between the asset and the crime); Sarah N. Welling, Smurfs, Money
Laundering, and the Federal Criminal Law: The Crime of Structuring Transactions, 41 FLA. L.
REv. 287, 294 (1989) (describing some of the statutory problems and judicial responses of the
money laundering statutes).
145. See United States v. Schifferli, 895 F.2d 987, 989 (4th Cir. 1990); United States v. 1966
Beechcraft Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d 947, 953 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. 26.075
Acres, 687 F. Supp. 1005, 1016 (E.D.N.C. 1988), aff'd sub. nom. United States v. Santoro, 866
F.2d 1538 (4th Cir. 1989).
146. See Schifferli, 895 F.2d'at 990 (explaining that for an action to constitute facilitation,
there must be a substantial connection between the property and the crime); 1966 Beechcraft
Aircraft Model King Air, 777 F.2d at 953 (stating that for property to be forfeitable under 21
U.S.C. § 881 it must have a substantial connection to the illegal activity); 26.075 Acres, 687 F.
Supp. at 1016 (finding an entire tract of land subject to forfeiture because of its substantial
connection to the drug violation).
147. See United States v. Daccarett, 6 F.3d 37, 56 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 38 Whalers
Cove Drive, 954 F.2d 29, 33 (2d Cir. 1992); United States v. One 1974 Cadillac Eldorado Sedan,
548 F.2d 421,423 (2d Cir. 1977).
148. See Daccarett, 6 F.3d at 56.
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between the property and the criminal activity must be more than
incidental.149
Despite the lack of clarity on the level of connection needed between
the forfeitable property and the criminal act, the courts agree on the
necessary amount of illegal activity to justify a forfeiture.15° If the requisite
connection is met between the asset and proscribed criminal activity, the
asset is subject to forfeiture no matter how much criminal activity has taken
place.15  An extreme example of this can be found in the Supreme Court's
decision in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co. 5 ' There the Court
found the presence of one cigarette of illegal marijuana on a yacht
sufficient to uphold the forfeiture of the entire vessel.1 53 In another case the
Eleventh Circuit accurately expressed the state of the law across the
country in explaining that "a vehicle is subject to forfeiture no matter how
small the quantity of contraband found."' 54 Translated to the context of
money laundering, one dollar of illegal money is sufficient to justify the
seizure of even the largest bank account, provided the clean money has the
necessary connection to the laundering of the illegal dollar.'55
The rise of the facilitation theory has drastically changed the
landscape of enforcement of the federal money laundering statute. Without
the facilitation theory, only those assets that were the direct result of
149. See Schifferli, 895 F.2d at 990 ("At minimum, the property must have more than an
incidental or fortuitous connection to criminal activity"); United States v. 916 Douglas Ave., 903
F.2d 490, 493 (7th Cir. 1990) (declining to read § 881 more leniently than requiring at least
something more than an incidental connection between the property and crime).
150. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 758.
151. See, e.g., United States v. One 1982 28' Int'l Vessel, 741 F.2d 1319, 1322 (11 th Cir.
1984) (stating that a vehicle is subject to forfeiture even though the amount of contraband
involved was "immeasurably small"); United States v. One 1976 Porsche 91 IS, 670 F.2d 810,
812 (9th Cir. 1979) (stating that "the relevant statutes require forfeiture without regard to the
amount of the contraband found in the vehicle .... ); United States v. One 1975 Mercedes 280S,
590 F.2d 196, 198 (6th Cir. 1978) ("Although the law in this respect appears harsh, it is well
settled that it is immaterial whether the amount of marijuana contained in the car is relatively
small.").
152. 416 U.S. 663 (1974).
153. See id. at 680.
154. See One 1982 28' Int'l Vessel, 741 F.2d at 1322 (quoting One 1976 Porshe, 670 F.2d at
812) (finding a nearly immeasurably small amount of contraband on a yacht justifying the
forfeiture of the entire boat).
155. Some commentators have suggested the rule allowing unlimited forfeitures no matter
how de minimis the level of criminal activity may change in the future. See Gordon, supra note
11, at 759-60. The Supreme Court's decision in Austin v. United States found that forfeiture
penalties were partially punitive in nature. 509 U.S. 602, 618 (1993). Punitive penalties are
subject to the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment and may be overturned. Id. at
622. However, the Austin Court refused to adopt a standard for determining when forfeiture
penalties could be considered excessive under the Eighth Amendment. Id. Because the Supreme
Court has refrained from articulating such a standard in the eleven years since the Austin decision,
it is unlikely it will do so in the future.
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criminal activities were subject to forfeiture. With the facilitation theory,
violators stand to lose not only the profits of their illegal enterprises, but
also every other asset they own that is held in the same location as any
amount of criminal profit. Prosecutors are given incredible latitude to go
after nearly unlimited assets at their own discretion. In addition, the assets
seized by prosecutors are used to partially fund the budgets of law
enforcement agencies, including the Justice Department.5 6 The ambiguous
nature of the facilitation theory and the wide discretion yielded by
prosecutors in seizing assets that will fund their own budgets, have led to
an expansion of civil and criminal forfeiture under the money laundering
statute that Congress could not have foreseen at the statute's passage.
II. THE EFFECT OF MODERN FORFEITURE LAWS ON THE ABILITY OF
CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS To HIRE ATTORNEYS
A. Statutory Framework and Implications
The first step in the criminal money laundering forfeiture process is
the conviction of a defendant for committing one of the proscribed
laundering acts in violation of the applicable federal law."5 7 Once a
conviction has been obtained, the judge then looks to the criminal forfeiture
provisions for money laundering to determine what property is subject to
forfeiture. 58 The applicable statute, 18 U.S.C. § 982, catalogs which assets
are subject to forfeiture for their connection to money laundering.1 59 It
further provides that the procedures for forfeitures imposed under § 982
shall be governed by the criminal forfeiture procedures in the Drug Act. 60
One of the most significant features of criminal forfeiture law under
the Drug Act is the effect of forfeitures on assets that have been transferred
to third parties. The Drug Act states that property subject to forfeiture
under the act vests in the United States at the time the criminal act took
place. '6 This order of vesting cannot take place until a conviction for the
156. See 28 U.S.C. § 524(c)(1) (2000) (establishing a special fund for the deposit of forfeiture
proceeds known as the Department of Justice Assets Forfeiture Fund which is available to the
Attorney General to use in the Department). The fact that proceeds of forfeiture actions are used
to fund justice department budgets presents a possible conflict of interest for prosecutors.
157. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1956-1957, 1960 (2000) (defining what conduct constitutes money
laundering under federal law).
158. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(1) (providing that assets "involved in" violations of §§ 1956,
1957, & 1960 are subject to forfeiture). The judge will also look at the applicable case law
interpreting what constitutes being "involved in" a violation as discussed above.
159. See id.
160. See 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1) (stating that criminal money laundering forfeitures shall be
governed by the forfeiture procedures outlined in 21 U.S.C. § 853 of the Drug Act).
161. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2000) ("All right, title, and interest in property described in
subsection (a) of this section vests in the United States upon the commission of the act giving rise
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underlying crime has been obtained, but once the conviction is obtained,
the United States is said to have held the property since the time of the
offense. 162 This becomes especially relevant when the property subject to
forfeiture has been transferred out of the ownership of the criminal
defendant. The new owner of the property could have gained ownership
before the defendant was convicted or even charged with a crime. In this
situation, if the property in question has already been involved in the
criminal act by the time the third party takes ownership, then upon a
conviction of the defendant the subject property will still be forfeitable to
the United States.163 Under the criminal forfeiture provisions of the Drug
Act, the third party will be considered to have never taken ownership of the
property because ownership of the property vested in the government at the
time of the criminal act."6
This statutory embodiment of the relation back doctrine standing alone
would seem to leave the innocent purchasers of criminal property with no
recourse. However, in enacting the criminal forfeiture provisions of the
Drug Act, Congress left innocent owners with some protection.'65 Within
the same statutory sentence that codifies the relation back doctrine and its
effect on third parties, Congress stated that a transferee may retain
ownership of property subject to forfeiture if "the transferee establishes in a
hearing pursuant to subsection (n) of this section that he is a bona fide
purchaser for value of such property who at the time of purchase was
reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
forfeiture under this section." '166
The procedure for innocent third parties attempting to protect their
ownership of property which the government is seeking to seize is outlined
in part (n) of § 853.167 After the government has obtained a conviction of
the guilty party and obtained an entry of forfeiture on the property from the
court, the government must publish notice of its intent to seize the
property.168 Within thirty days any third party claiming an interest in the
property subject to forfeiture may petition the court for a hearing to assess
the merits of their claim. 69 At the hearing, the claimant may present
evidence, testify on his own behalf, and cross-examine other witnesses. 7 °
to forfeiture under this section.").
162. See id.
163. See id.
164. See id.
165. See id. (protecting "bona-fide purchasers" of criminal property).
166. Id.
167. Id. at § 853(n).
168. See id. at § 853(n)(1).
169. See id. at § 853(n)(2).
170. See id. at § 853(n)(5).
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However, the claimant has no right to a jury trial, and the hearing will be
administered by a judge alone. 7' If the claimant proves in the hearing that
at the time of purchase he was a bona fide purchaser and was reasonably
without cause to believe the property was subject to forfeiture, he is entitled
to retain ownership.'72
Additionally, the forfeiture provisions of the Drug Act give
prosecutors the power to obtain restraining orders on property potentially
subject to forfeiture even before filing an indictment."' The purpose of
these restraining orders and injunctions are to preserve potentially
forfeitable property so that a defendant may not transfer or expend it before
the government takes ownership. 74 The provisions allowing prosecutors to
issue preliminary restraining orders and to go after criminal assets in the
hands of third parties were added to the forfeiture statutes in 1984.17"
These provisions were needed because defendants were able to transfer or
conceal their forfeitable assets after charges had been filed but before
prosecutors could gain a conviction. 76 The addition of these prosecutorial
tools has drastically increased the breadth and effectiveness of the criminal
forfeiture laws. 177
While the 1984 amendments have been widely commended for their
success in confiscating a drastically increased amount of criminal assets,
they have also led to another consequence that has the potential to
significantly and negatively impact the criminal justice system. 78 Because
preindictment restraining orders and injunctions give prosecutors the ability
to freeze assets in advance of trial, criminal defendants may not use those
assets to fund their potential need for a legal defense. In the context of
money laundering, this denial can be of great consequence for a defendant.
Under the facilitation theory, where one dollar of dirty money subjects an
entire account to forfeiture, most defendants accused of money laundering
will not have any assets free from potential forfeiture. 179  Therefore,
prosecutors may obtain a pretrial order freezing the money in all of a given
defendant's bank accounts and thereby deny him the opportunity to hire an
171. See id. at § 853(n)(2).
172. See id. at § 853(n)(6)(B).
173. See id. at § 853(e).
174. See id.
175. See Comprehensive Forfeiture Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-473, §§ 301-323, 98 Stat.
1837, 2040-41 (codified in titles 18, 19, 21, & 28 U.S.C.).
176. See Winick, supra note 7, at 769 (explaining the hole in the forfeiture statutes before
1984 that provided defendants a method to evade serious asset forfeitures before conviction).
177. See id. at 770 (stating that the 1984 amendments "expanded both the number of crimes
subject to criminal forfeiture and the scope of property subject to forfeiture").
178. See id. at 770-71 (explaining the effectiveness of tools provided to prosecutors in the
1984 amendments).
179. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(a)(2) (2000).
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attorney of his own choosing.
This problem is not limited to the context of preindictment restraining
orders. If no preliminary order to freeze assets is given, a defendant on
trial for money laundering is still free to pay his attorney any amount of
money he desires. However, in the event the defendant is convicted, the
government will be able to force the attorney to forfeit any money he was
paid out of criminally tainted funds. 8 ° Under the forfeiture statute, in order
for the attorney to retain his fee, the attorney would have to prove he had
no reasonable cause to believe his client's accounts were subject to
forfeiture.' 8 ' It would be nearly impossible for an attorney who was
retained to defend a client accused of money laundering to prove that he
had no cause to believe that his client's assets were subject to forfeiture.
The implications of this practice can be highlighted by a detailed
examination of a 2003 Eleventh Circuit decision affirming the forfeiture of
fees paid to an attorney whose client was later convicted.'82 In United
States v. McCorkle, s3 the defendant who was on trial for a violation of the
federal money laundering statute"8 paid his attorney F. Lee Bailey a two
million dollar retainer fee.'85 At trial, the defendant was convicted of
laundering money and the jury entered a forfeiture order which included
the two million dollars paid to Bailey.'86 Bailey then filed a § 853(n)
petition for a hearing in order to prove "that he had received the money as a
bona fide purchaser for value without cause to believe that the money was
subject to forfeiture.' 18 7 The magistrate judge denied Bailey's § 853(n)
petition and the Eleventh Circuit affirmed.'
Bailey further argued that the prosecution gave him several signals
before trial to indicate that they would not attempt to seize his attorneys'
fees after a possible conviction. 8 9 Bailey maintained that these signals
would have inclined any reasonable lawyer to accept the funds and expend
180. See id. at §§ 853(c), (n)(6)(B). Prosecutors may seize these funds under the relation
back doctrine.
181. See id.
182. See United States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292, 1292 (11 th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 125
S. Ct. 549 (U.S. 2003).
183. Id.
184. See id. at 1294, nn.1-2 (explaining that the defendant was convicted of executing a
telemarketing scheme violating mail fraud (18 U.S.C. § 1341) and wire fraud (§ 1343) laws and of
laundering the profits in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(2)(B)).
185. See id. at 1294 (stating that the defendant placed the $2 million retainer fee in trust in the
Cayman Islands and transferred the trust to his attorney).
186. See id. at 1294.
187. Id.
188. See id. ("It is also clear that Bailey knew from the outset that the funds were subject to
forfeiture.").
189. See id. (stating that Bailey claimed he received seven signals from the government that
he was entitled to keep the otherwise forfeitable funds).
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them on his client's defense. 9 ' The Court quickly dispensed with Bailey's
argument by pointing out that the forfeiture statute expressly grants the
government discretion to use such measures. 9 ' Additionally, the Court
stated that "a district court's exercise of discretion not to enter a pretrial
restraining order does not 'immunize' nonrestrained assets from subsequent
forfeiture under § 853(c), if they are transferred to an attorney to pay legal
fees."'92 The decision in the McCorkle case was not unexpected and the
Court's reasoning accurately reflects the current state of criminal forfeiture
law. The importance of the decision is in providing an example to criminal
defense attorneys who are contemplating defending their clients against
criminal forfeiture proceedings. Because of the state of criminal forfeiture
law today, few private defense attorneys will agree to take a case this far.
The McCorkle decision provides a shining example to the defense bar of
what will happen if they do.
B. Case Law Development
While the government's interpretation of the criminal forfeiture statute
as authorizing the forfeiture of attorneys' fees is clearly a plausible one, the
ambiguous language of the statute leaves room for defense attorneys to
petition the courts for a different result. However, the real strength of the
current interpretation of the doctrine is not found in the wording of the
statute, but rather in the depth of federal case law supporting it. The
federal courts have repeatedly upheld prosecutorial efforts to seize assets in
such a way, before or after trial, so as to deny criminal defendants the
means necessary to hire a private attorney of their choice.'93
In United States v. Monsanto,94 the United States Supreme Court was
provided an opportunity to interpret the criminal forfeiture statute in such a
190. See id. at 1296-97 (stating Bailey's rationale for spending money held in the "defense
fund").
191. See id. at 1297 (stating that the statutory scheme directly allows the government to
proceed by its own discretion).
192. See id. at 1297 (citing Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 (1989)).
193. See, e.g., United States v. Monsanto, 491 U.S. 600, 600 (1989) (holding that there is no
exemption from § 853's restraining order or forfeiture provisions for assets defendants want to
use to pay an attorney); Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 623 (1989)
(refusing to grant protection to attorneys' fees seized under § 853(c)); United States v. Bissell,
866 F.2d 1343, 1349 (11 th Cir. 1989) ("As a consequence of the provisions in § 853, an attorney
retained to defend on whose assets are subject to forfeiture and restraint may go
uncompensated."); United States v. Moya-Gomez, 860 F.2d 706, 720 (7th Cir. 1988) (explaining
that any property transferred to an attorney may ultimately be forfeited to the government upon
conviction); United States v. Nichols, 841 F.2d 1485, 1496 (10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the
language of § 853 is unambiguous and does not allow an exemption of attorneys' fees from
forfeiture).
194. 491 U.S. 600 (1989).
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way as to protect the defendant's ability to hire counsel. 195 The defendant
was indicted for several violations of drug and racketeering laws.' 96
Prosecutors also sought the forfeiture of various assets that the defendant
allegedly obtained through the proceeds of illegal narcotics activities. 97 In
furtherance of this effort, prosecutors obtained a postindictment restraining
order preventing the sale or transfer of two of the defendant's properties.' 98
The defendant filed a motion seeking to modify the restraining order to
permit him to use a portion of the frozen assets to hire an attorney of his
choosing.199 The district court refused to grant this request and ruled the
defendant to be de facto indigent.2°°
It is not simply the fact that the Supreme Court failed to interpret the
criminal forfeiture laws as permitting a defendant to pay to defend himself
that is so alarming, but rather the force of language with which Justice
White dismissed the defendant's claims.2"' Justice White seemed to leave
no hints that the Court may be willing to listen to other arguments on this
point in the future nor did he express any concern that the law may be
problematic for the criminal justice system. °2 In writing for the Court
Justice White explained:
Section 853(e) provides that a person convicted of the offenses
charged in respondent's indictment "shall forfeit ... any property"
that was derived from the commission of these offenses. After
setting out this rule, § 853(a) repeats later in its text that upon
conviction a sentencing court "shall order" forfeiture of all property
described in § 853(a). Congress could not have chosen stronger
words to express its intent that forfeiture be mandatory in cases
where the statute applied, or broader words to define the scope of
what was to be forfeited.0 3
Such a strong affirmation by the Supreme Court of the government's
interpretation of the current criminal forfeiture statutes leaves little hope for
potential defendants that this rule will change in the future.
Additionally, on the same day the Supreme Court handed down the
195. Id. at 600.
196. See id.
197. See id.
198. See id. at 603 (enjoining the sale of a $30,000 apartment in the Bronx, New York and a
$335,000 house in Mount Vernon, New York, both owned by the defendant).
199. See id. at 604.
200. See id. at 605.
201. See id. at 607 (stating that nothing in the § 853's all-inclusive statute "hints at the idea
that assets to be used to pay an attorney are not 'property' within the statute's meaning.").
202. See id. at 615 (rejecting defendant's claims that the restraining order denied his 5th
Amendment due process rights or his Sixth Amendment rights to counsel of choice).
203. Id. at 607.
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decision in Monsanto, the Court released a companion decision soundly
rejecting a defendant's claims that the government's reading of the statute
violated his constitutional rights.2 4 In Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v.
United States,2 5 the Court echoed its interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 853
outlined in Monsanto as authorizing pretrial restraining orders and
postconviction forfeitures of attorneys' fees.2 6  The Caplin & Drysdale
decision has independent importance apart from reiterating the Court's
decision in Monsanto, however. Even if one accepts the Monsanto Court's
interpretation of the statutory language in § 853 as correct, the application
of this interpretation may still be challenged on constitutional grounds.
In Caplin & Drysdale, the defendant was charged with running a
massive drug importation and distribution scheme in violation of the
Continuing Criminal Enterprise law.20 7  The government obtained a
preindictment restraining order freezing certain specified assets of the
defendant. 2 s The government later obtained a conviction and the District
Court ordered the forfeiture of virtually all of the defendants assets,
including those paid to his attorney. 2°9 The defendant argued that assets
used to pay attorneys' fees are exempt from forfeiture under § 853, and if
not, the failure to provide such an exception renders the statute
unconstitutional.2 °
The defendant in Caplin & Drysdale pointed out that the restraining
order prevented him from hiring an attorney of his own selection and
forced him to accept one appointed by the court.21  He argued that this
practice denied his Sixth Amendment right to counsel of choice.212 The
Court rejected this claim and found that the statute in no way denies the
defendant his Sixth Amendment right to select his counsel of choice.
2
,
3
204. Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617 (1989).
205. Id.
206. See id. at 623 (referring to the Court's decision in Monsanto handed down on the same
day which denies defendants the ability to use forfeitable assets to pay attorneys' fees).
207. See id. at 617 (stating that the defendant was convicted of violating the CCE law 21
U.S.C. § 848).
208. See id. (stating that the District Court entered a preliminary restraining order under 21
U.S.C. § 853(e)(1 )(A) preventing him from transferring the property).
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. See id.
212. See id.
213. See id. at 625 ("we observe that nothing in § 853 prevents a defendant from hiring the
attorney of his choice, or disqualifies any attorney from serving as a defendant's counsel"). The
Court, however, recognized that:
[T]here will be cases where a defendant will be unable to retain the attorney of his
choice, when that defendant would have been able to hire that lawyer if he had access to
forfeitable assets, and if there was no risk that fees paid by the defendant to his counsel
would later be recouped under § 853(c).
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The Court reasoned that the criminal forfeiture statute simply provides for
214the seizure of assets involved in specified criminal activities. It further
explained that "whatever the full extent of the Sixth Amendment's
protection of one's right to retain counsel of his choosing, that protection
does not go beyond 'the individual's right to spend his own money to
obtain the advice and assistance of... counsel.' "215 Justice White, again
writing for the Court, rationalized that when an order of forfeiture is
obtained, ownership of the assets in question "relate back" to the time of
the criminal act.216 Thus, at the time of trial when the defendant seeks to
use his assets to pay his attorney, under the relation back doctrine these
assets are property of the United States government.2"7 Accordingly, it is
through the legal fiction of the relation back doctrine that the Supreme
Court has justified the refusal to recognize a criminal defendant's Sixth
Amendment right to hire the attorney of his own selection.
The decisions of the Supreme Court in Monsanto and Caplin &
Drysdale have never been seriously questioned or limited by the Court in
the fifteen years since they were handed down. The decisions have been
consistently followed by several Federal Courts of Appeals."8 There is no
serious reason for criminal defense attorneys to expect this rule to be
changed by Congress or the Supreme Court. However, after a thorough
examination of the rule and its implications on the fairness of the criminal
justice system, a compelling argument can be made for the discontinuation
of the forfeiture of attorneys' fees.
Id.
214. Id. at 627.
215. See id. at 626 (citing Waiters v. Nat'l Assn. of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 370
(1985)).
216. Id. at 625.
217. See id. at 626.
218. See, e.g., United States v. Melrose East Subdivision, 357 F.3d 493, 500 (5th Cir. 2004)
(stating that neither due process nor the Sixth Amendment require that assets needed to pay an
attorney be unrestrained or exempted from forfeiture (citing Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 625;
citing Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 616)); United States v. Moffitt, Zwerling & Kemler, P.C., 83 F.3d
660, 665 (4th Cir. 1996) (stating that there is no constitutional right to spend another's money to
pay for attorneys' fees, and therefore forfeiture of attorneys' fees is constitutional (quoting Caplin
v. Drysdale, 491 U.S. at 626)); United States v. Unit No. 7 & Unit No. 8 of Shop in Grove
Condominium, 890 F.2d 82, 84 (8th Cir. 1989) (agreeing with Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto
that neither the Fifth nor Sixth Amendment rights of a defendant are offended by forfeiture of
property which would otherwise be used to pay an attorney (citing Caplin & Drysdale, 491 U.S.
at 622-35)).
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III. POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF SEIZURE AND FORFEITURE OF ASSETS USED
TO PAY ATTORNEYS' FEES
A. The Financial and Ethical Impacts on Private Defense Attorneys
The preindictment seizure or postconviction forfeiture of assets used
to pay attorneys' fees does not leave criminal defendants entirely without
the ability to be represented by counsel of their choice. Defendants may
still hire any attorney they would like and can use their frozen assets to pay
attorneys' fees up to the hourly rates and maximum fees provided under the
Criminal Justice Act.219 Under the Criminal Justice Act, attorneys
representing criminal clients in forfeiture actions would be paid at a rate
not exceeding $60 per hour for time spent in court and a rate not exceeding
$40 per hour for time reasonably spent out of court.2 0  No matter how
many total hours an attorney spends in or out of court on the case, the
Criminal Justice Act only allows a maximum payment of $5,200 per
attorney. 22' However, these rates are drastically below the average rates
charged by experienced criminal attorneys in private practice.222 A 1985
study found the general hourly rates charged by private defense attorneys in
large cities to be between $150 and $250 per hour.223 In addition, the same
study found the average per hour overhead costs of running a private law
firm to be in excess of $39.224 In comparison, the federal government will
pay outside counsel as much as $285 per hour to represent it.225 Especially
when considering the length of time, complexity, and expenses of
providing a vigorous defense in a federal criminal trial, it will be very
difficult for private attorneys to take on such cases at the compensation rate
allowed by the Criminal Justice Act.226
The financial risk incurred by private defense attorneys is not the only
factor contributing to their decreased willingness to accept criminal
219. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3006A(d)(l) to (2) (2000).
220. See id. at § 3006A(d)(l) (the statute also provides that the Judicial Council can
determine that a higher rate not in excess of $75 per hour is justified for certain circuits).
221. See id. at § 3006A(d)(2).
222. See Winick, supra note 7, at 773 (1989) (stating that the average rates charged by private
attorneys are generally between three to seven times that allowed by the Criminal Justice Act).
223. See id. (citing Criminal Justice Act Revision of 1985: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
On Courts, Civil Liberties, and the Admin. of the Justice of the House Comm. on the Judiciary,
99th Cong. 3 (1985) (testimony of U.S. District Judge Thomas J. MacBride, Chairman of the U.S.
Judicial Conference Comm. to Implement the Criminal Justice Act) (reprinted in Sup. Doc. No.
Y4.J89/1:99/41)).
224. See id.
225. Id. at n.39.
226. Id. at 774 ("In view of the complexity, duration, and intense time pressures of such
cases, experienced defense counsel-even when well-paid-often find it impossible to undertake
such cases and to maintain their private practices at the same time.").
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forfeiture cases. The decision of whether or not to take on a criminal
forfeiture case also presents significant ethical dilemmas for defense
attorneys. Essentially, when a defense attorney takes on a criminal case
where his fee will be subject to forfeiture upon conviction, he is working
on a contingency fee basis. If the attorney can get his client cleared of all
charges, or at least avoid a postconviction decree of forfeiture, the attorney
will be free to retain his fee. Conversely, if the client is convicted and a
decree of forfeiture is entered, the attorney will have to forfeit his fee and
suffer any losses he incurred while trying the case. This presents a
dilemma for the attorney in that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
prevent attorneys from representing criminal defendants on a contingency
basis.227 Contingency representation of criminal defendants is ethically
banned because it makes the defense attorney an interested party in the
case. Such an arrangement has the potential for creating conflicts of
interest between attorney and client. 228 The United States Supreme Court
has stated that when a constitutional right to counsel exists, the Sixth
Amendment guarantees representation that is free from conflicts of
interest.229
Furthermore, the asset forfeiture provisions of federal criminal law
may prevent attorneys from thoroughly investigating all aspects of a
client's case. If a defense attorney is reasonably without cause to know
that his client's property is subject to forfeiture, then the attorney will be
protected from forfeiting his fee after conviction. 230  The attorney may
think his client has not engaged in behavior that will subject his property to
forfeiture. If the court later finds that the property is forfeitable, the
attorney's fee will be protected as long as he was not on notice of the
forfeitable nature of the property at the time he received the property.23 1
This protection gives defense attorneys a financial incentive to avoid
learning too much information about their clients. The financial incentive
also gives them a reason to advocate less zealously for their client. 32
227. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.5(d)(2) (2004) (providing that, "A lawyer
shall not enter into an arrangement for, charge, or collect, a contingent fee for representing a
defendant in a criminal case").
228. One example of the conflicts imposed on defense attorneys in contingent fee
relationships is found in the plea bargaining process. In such plea discussions, an attorney may
be tempted to recommend against a plea because it could jeopardize his fee. See Holloway v.
Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475,481 (1978); Winick, supra note 7, n.46.
229. See Wood v. Georgia, 450 U.S. 261, 271 (1981); Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 335, 349-
50 (1980); Holloway, 435 U.S. at 481.
230. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(c) (2000) (stating that property otherwise forfeitable that has been
transferred to bona fide purchaser for value who did not reasonably have cause to know the
property was forfeitable at the time of purchase may be retained by the purchaser).
231. See id.
232. A defense attorney cannot zealously represent his client if he is attempting to limit the
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B. The Impact on the Fairness of the Justice System
One of the most troubling consequences of the forfeiture of attorneys'
fees is the potential for tipping the balance of the adversary system in favor
of the prosecution. First, the prosecutorial discretion to add criminal
forfeiture to a wide variety of federal charges gives the government a
certain amount of control over which defense attorneys it will face at trial.
Second, the denial of this once very lucrative area of criminal defense work
may have a significant impact on the number of highly qualified attorneys
willing to work their way up the criminal defense ladder. In the long run
these are potentially very serious consequences that Congress likely did not
intend when strengthening the federal drug laws in the 1970s and 1980s. 33
The majority of criminal forfeiture actions are brought as additional
charges on top of underlying violations of RICO,2 3 4 the Continuing
Criminal Enterprise Law,23 5 or one of several federal money laundering
statutes.36 These three massive statutory schemes criminalize a multitude
of different types of conduct.23 7 The effect of the criminal forfeiture law is
to give prosecutors the ability to tack on a forfeiture claim to any of
hundreds of different underlying criminal acts. 238 Furthermore, the decision
to include a forfeiture demand is under the complete discretion of the
prosecutor.239  As has been discussed, in most cases the addition of a
forfeiture demand will work to remove the vast majority of private defense
attorneys who cannot afford the financial or ethical risk. As one
commentator correctly points out, "As a result, the government can gain the
'ultimate tactical advantage of being able to exclude competent defense
counsel as it chooses merely by appending a forfeiture indictment.' ,1240
Giving the prosecution any degree of veto power over the defendants'
choice of counsel is clearly not a characteristic of an evenly balanced
criminal justice system.
The second important impact the forfeiture of attorneys' fees will have
amount of information he learns about his client and his client's case.
233. See generally Winick, supra note 7, at 772 (providing an overview of the impact of
criminal forfeiture on the adversary system).
234. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (2000).
235. 21 U.S.C. § 848.
236. See 18 U.S.C. § 982.
237. See Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, 87 COLUM.
L. REV. 661, 663 (1987) (stating that RICO is a weapon prosecutors can use against virtually any
kind of criminal behavior).
238. See id.
239. See 21 U.S.C. § 853(e)(1) (explaining that the court may enter a forfeiture decree "upon
application of the United States"); see also United States v. McCorkle, 321 F.3d 1292, 1297 (11 th
Cir. 2003) (stating that the statutory scheme expressly grants the government discretion whether
to use forfeiture measures).
240. See Winick, supra note 7, at 778.
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on the criminal defense system is on the makeup of the defense bar as a
whole. The representation of white collar criminals, wealthy drug dealers,
and other organized criminal enterprises can be very lucrative business for
attorneys. Whether this result is ethically desirable or not, it has the effect
of bringing many bright and ambitious young lawyers into criminal defense
work.24 ' While these intelligent young lawyers may not desire a career
representing indigent criminal defendants, they are willing to do so in order
to learn and advance in the criminal defense bar. With the denial of a large
percentage of the highly profitable criminal defense work, more and more
young lawyers will opt for high paying corporate and civil work instead.242
The public defenders' offices around the country are already alarmingly
overworked and understaffed.243 The further depletion of their attorney
base could have serious long term consequences for the adequacy of our
system of public criminal defense.2"
IV. CREATING A SOLUTION THROUGH STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
The stated congressional purpose in enacting the criminal forfeiture
provisions of 21 U.S.C. § 853 was to provide a significant deterrent to
organized crime and large scale narcotics trafficking by denying violators
the vast profits of their enterprise.245 The negative effects on the procedural
rights and protections of not only wealthy drug traffickers but all criminal
defendants was not within Congress' intentions. 46 While the Court's
current interpretation of the criminal forfeiture statute as authorizing pre-
and postconviction forfeitures of attorneys' fees is plausible, it is not the
only interpretation allowed by the statute's wording. The current state of
the law is a result of the Supreme Court's acceptance of the Justice
Department's interpretation of 21 U.S.C. § 853 in United States v.
Monsanto47 and Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States.
248
Consequently, a remedy to the present inequities in the criminal justice
system caused by the forfeiture of attorneys' fees need not require any
241. See id. at 781.
242. See id.
243. See United States v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1349 (D. Colo. 1985), aff d 960 F.2d
1501 (10th Cir. 1992) (explaining that the resources and expertise needed to defend a RICO
violation is beyond the ability of the average federal public defenders office that is already
overworked and understaffed).
244. See Winick, supra note 7, at 783-84.
245. See, e.g., H.R. REP. No. 101-427 (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 928, 1002
(Sup. Doc. No. Y1.1/8: 169-170).
246. See Richard W. Mass, Note, Forfeiture of Attorneys' Fees: Should Defendants Be
Allowed to Retain the "Rolls Royce of Attorneys" with the "Fruits of the Crime"?, 39 STAN. L.
REv. 663,687 (1987).
247. 491 U.S. 600, 616 (1989).
248. 491 U.S. 617, 635 (1989).
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affirmative action from Congress. All that is necessary is a reinterpretation
of the forfeiture provisions of § 853 by the Supreme Court under the
appropriate standard for statutory interpretation.
In interpreting the criminal forfeiture laws the federal appellate courts
have uniformly asserted that Congress made no express statement that
attorneys' fees should be excluded from forfeiture.2 49 However, one could
make just as strong an argument that attorneys' fees should be excluded
from forfeiture because Congress made no express statement including
them. Congress defined property subject to forfeiture as, "(1) real property,
including things growing on, affixed to, and found in land; and (2) tangible
and intangible personal property, including rights, privileges, interests,
claims, and securities.""25 While this language does not clearly include or
exempt assets used to pay attorneys' fees from forfeiture, it is open to
interpretation.
Assets used to pay attorneys' fees are different in nature than the other
assets subject to forfeiture for violations of criminal laws. The purpose
behind the imposition of criminal forfeiture penalties is to deny those
convicted of violating criminal laws the profits of their illegal activities.2
The key point in this rationale is that asset forfeiture is a penalty imposed
on those defendants who have been found guilty. The courts' current
interpretation of criminal forfeiture law punishes those who have not yet
been convicted. It not only imposes preconviction criminal sanctions on
these defendants, but it unfairly increases their odds of being convicted at
trial. The most central premise of the American system of criminal
justice is that defendants are considered innocent until proven guilty.2153
The Courts' current interpretation of § 853 ignores this principle in such a
way as to give prosecutors an unfair tool against defendants who have the
means to hire their own attorneys.
The language of the statutory exemption of assets transferred to third
parties also leaves room for differing interpretations. Section 853(c)
provides that bona fide purchasers for value of forfeitable property may
retain the property if they prove that at the time of purchase they were
"reasonably without cause to believe that the property was subject to
249. See Monsanto, 491 U.S. at 607.
250. 21 U.S.C. § 853(b) (2000).
251. See Gordon, supra note 11, at 744.
252. Postconviction forfeitures also work as a preconviction penalty. Due to the fact that
defense attorneys risk losing their entire payment upon the conviction of their client, they will
generally refuse to take such cases, thereby denying the defendant his choice of counsel.
253. See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 503 (1976) ("The presumption of innocence,
although not articulated in the Constitution, is a basic component of a fair trial under our system
of criminal justice.").
[Vol. 83
SEIZURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
forfeiture under this section. As with § 853's definition of property
subject to forfeiture, the statutory language in the bona fide purchaser
exemption does not expressly mention attorneys' fees. However, as several
federal circuit courts pointed out before the Supreme Court's decisions in
Monsanto and Caplin & Drysdale, the language of the bona fide purchaser
exemption leaves ample room to include attorneys' fees.255 Congress made
a decision to provide an exemption for bona fide purchasers who were
"reasonably without cause to believe" the property was subject to
forfeiture. 6 If Congress intended a hard and fast rule forfeiting every type
of property a transferee had cause to know was forfeitable, they could have
simply used the language "without cause to believe." There would be no
need for Congress to preface it with the phrase "reasonably. 257
The inclusion of the language "reasonably without cause" does not
mandate an exemption for attorneys' fees. However, it does manifest an
intent by Congress to exempt from forfeiture those assets whose seizure
does not fall within the congressional purpose in passing the law. If the
forfeiture of attorneys' fees does not seem to be within Congress's intent in
passing § 853 and the language of the statute openly permits another
interpretation, the courts should hold as much. Several courts have pointed
to the legislative history of the act in searching for such a congressional
purpose. In United States v. Nichols,258 the Tenth Circuit explained:
First, the Senate report contains a footnote that reads: "The
provision [18 U.S.C. § 1963(m)] should be construed to deny relief
to third parties acting as nominees of the defendant or who have
knowingly engaged in sham or fraudulent transactions .... Second,
the Senate report discussion of the third party transfer provision says,
"The purpose of this provision is to permit the voiding of certain
preconviction transfers and so close a potential loophole in current
law whereby the criminal forfeiture sanction could be avoided by
transfers that were not 'arms' length' [sic] transactions. 259
254. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c). See also 21 U.S.C. § 853(n)(6)(B) (providing the same standard of
proof to be shown at a hearing in order for a third party transferee to retain forfeitable property).
The courts have generally considered attorneys paid for legal services to be bona fide purchasers
for value. See Winick, supra note 7, 844-47.
255. See, e.g., United States v. Thier, 801 F.2d 1463, 1471 (5th Cir. 1986) (summarizing
several district court case holdings that address requests to exempt bona fide attorneys' fees and
agreeing with those district courts that rule in favor of the exemption requests), modified 809 F.2d
249 (5th Cir. 1987).
256. 21 U.S.C. § 853(c).
257. See Winick, supra note 7, at 845 (arguing that congressional inclusion of the phrase
"reasonably" at least makes the statute ambiguous).
258. 841 F.2d 1485 (10th Cir. 1988), rev'd491 U.S. 600 (1989).
259. See id. (quoting S. REP. No. 98-225, at 200-01 (1984), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N.
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The Senate reports cited in Nichols express a congressional intent to
prevent the use of fraudulent or sham transactions by defendants attempting
to avoid a pending asset forfeiture. Certainly, a criminal defendant's
payment of a private defense attorney to represent him and help avoid
criminal charges altogether would not be considered a sham transaction.
The courts can use the leeway given them in the language of the statue
to interpret § 853 in a way that will still accomplish the law enforcement
goals of the act without negatively impacting criminal defendants in the
way it does today. The bona fide purchaser exemption of § 853(c) should
be interpreted to authorize the forfeiture of only fraudulent or sham
attorneys' fees. If a defendant pays his attorney a large sum with the intent
to keep that money away from the government, the money would still be
forfeitable.26° But when the defendant is only intending to obtain the best
defense attorney to represent his interests in court, the fee would be
exempt. Such an interpretation would still provide prosecutors the tools
necessary to deny major drug traffickers and organized criminals the profits
of their enterprise, without using an unfair balance in the courtroom as a
means of doing so.
CONCLUSION
Congress passed the 1984 amendments to the criminal forfeiture
provisions to give prosecutors the weapon necessary to make the RICO,
Continuing Criminal Enterprise, and federal money laundering statutes
effective. Before the amendments, violators awaiting trial would simply
transfer their assets to third parties to avoid forfeiture to the government.
The criminal forfeiture provisions of the Drug Act were unable to provide
the economic deterrent necessary to slow down organized drug trafficking
in the United States. After the relation back doctrine was applied to the act
in 1984, prosecutors were able to seize criminal assets in the hands of third
parties and put a significant dent in the profitability of organized crime.
However, due to the ambiguous language in the amended criminal
forfeiture laws, prosecutors were able to take the act further and use it in
unintended ways to give themselves an unfair advantage in the courtroom.
The federal courts have agreed with the prosecutors and improperly
interpreted the ambiguous language of 21 U.S.C. § 853 in such a way as to
deny criminal defendants their constitutional right to counsel of choice and
3182, 3383-84).
260. In an effort to protect their assets from forfeiture, defendants could pay their attorneys
exorbitant fees with the understanding that the attorney would return the majority of the fee after
the trial. The defendant would be assured that all funds paid to an attorney would be protected
from forfeiture. Such a loophole could be avoided by interpreting § 853(c) as authorizing the
forfeiture of such sham payments of attorneys' fees.
[Vol. 83
SEIZURE OF ATTORNEYS' FEES
substantially inhibit the protections of the criminal justice system in
unintended ways. This significant problem can be easily remedied without
any action from Congress."' A simple reinterpretation of the criminal
forfeiture laws as exempting legitimate attorneys' fees from forfeiture will
reestablish the balance of fairness in the courtroom and continue to allow
prosecutors to deny criminals the vast majority of their illegitimate profits.
Such a judicial reassessment by the Supreme Court is not unprecedented in
American jurisprudence and is most surely warranted in an effort to
safeguard the protections of our criminal justice system.
BRIAN FORK
261. It is significant to note that Congress always has the option of simply changing the
language of the law to specifically exclude attorneys' fees from inclusion in criminal asset
forfeiture.
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